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War College Press: From the Editors

from the editors
The fiscal crisis that continues to grip this nation has generated enormous challenges for America’s defense establishment. At the same time, by upending old
certainties and assumptions, it has also opened the way for fresh thinking about
our defense priorities and ways of doing business. In “Marching toward the
Sweet Spot: Options for the U.S. Marine Corps in a Period of Austerity,” Robert P.
Kozloski offers an example of such fresh thinking regarding the way forward for
the Marine Corps, a topic that has garnered much attention since the winding
down of the combat missions of the Corps in Iraq and Afghanistan. A major focus of his analysis is the relationship of the Marine Corps to the Navy, on the one
hand, and, on the other, to the special operations community. Robert Kozloski is
a program analyst for the Department of the Navy and a former Marine.
Fiscal constraints also continue to pose major problems for our NATO allies
and the NATO alliance as a whole. In “Smart Defense: Brave New Approach or
Déjà Vu?,” Paul Johnson, Tim LaBenz, and Darrell Driver review past and current
efforts within the alliance to enhance multinational collaboration through a variety of specialized programs, such as the Deployable Air Task Force spearheaded
by the Benelux countries and the very recent initiative linking all NATO special
operations forces. They conclude that this “smart defense” approach, while certainly not wholly new, holds out considerable promise as the alliance struggles
with defining its missions in a post-Afghanistan era and balancing its priorities
in a strategic environment of severe economic uncertainty.
In “Toward ‘Land’ or toward ‘Sea’: The High-Speed Railway and China’s
Grand Strategy,” Wu Zhengyu offers a contribution to the ongoing debate within
academic and policy circles in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) concerning
that nation’s geostrategic challenges and the merits of its relatively recent turn to
the sea. It is not widely known that in recent years the Chinese have also made
massive investments in high-speed railroads linking the country’s developed
eastern seaboard to the interior. Though clearly motivated in significant part by
a desire to consolidate the regime’s grip on its restive western provinces, particularly Tibet, these railway projects are evidently viewed by some among China’s
elites as key enablers of a strategic option for the PRC that is fundamentally in
tension with its ambitious naval buildup of the last decade or so and its maritimeoriented commercial and energy policies. In a classic geopolitical analysis (of a
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sort that is common in today’s China but increasingly rare in the West), Wu argues that the option of continental expansion is unrealistic given the difficulties
it would necessarily create in the PRC’s relationships with Russia and would-be
clients in Central Asia. At the same time, the author does not see it as necessary
or desirable for the PRC to challenge directly the American presence in the East
Asian littorals. Wu Zhengyu is a professor in the School of International Studies
at Renmin University of China in Beijing.
Practitioners of war gaming know that this arcane field remains more art than
science. The Naval War College has a long gaming tradition, one that has been
at the forefront of methodological thinking and innovation in this area (Francis
J. McHugh’s 1966 classic Fundamentals of War Gaming, for example, has recently
been reprinted by the College). In “Adjudication: The Diabolus in Machina of War
Gaming,” Stephen Downes-Martin continues in this tradition with an analysis of
the usually overlooked role of adjudicators in certain kinds of war games—those
that set out to “discover” new lessons in warfare at the operational or strategic
level. He argues that adjudicators should themselves be regarded as “players” in
such games, that as much attention should be paid in game design and execution
to the beliefs such players articulate in the course of a game as to the formal decisions they make. Stephen Downes-Martin is a professor in the Warfare Analysis
and Research Department of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies.
The Gaza blockade incident of January 2009 and the controversy surrounding
it is a prime example of what some in recent years have usefully characterized by
the neologism “lawfare.” The “human rights activists” aboard the Turkish ship
Mavi Marmara who attempted to breach Israel’s proclaimed blockade of the
Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip were clearly attempting to provoke an incident that
could be used to accuse Israel of violating international law; they succeeded when
an Israeli boarding party was resisted by some of those on the ship, leading to
violence in which nine Turkish citizens were killed. Investigations of the incident
were conducted by special panels of legal experts in Turkey, Israel, and the United
Nations, with results that were largely predictable. In “The Gaza Flotilla Incident
and the Modern Law of Blockade,” James Farrant asks what can be learned from
this experience not only about the merits of the various positions taken over
this matter but about its implications for the current status of the international
law of blockade. Lieutenant Commander James Farrant is the first Royal Navy
exchange officer in the International Law Department of the Center for Naval
Warfare Studies.
The Royal Navy is also represented in this issue by Ben Lombardi and David
Rudd, “The Type 45 Daring-Class Destroyer: How Project Management Problems Led to Fewer Ships.” Lombardi and Rudd provide an extended account of
the evolution of the United Kingdom’s Type 45 air-defense-destroyer replacement
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program over the last decade or so, detailing the political and bureaucratic obstacles it has faced as well as the management mistakes that resulted in a buy of
only six vessels out of an original requirement of twelve. Their conclusion: “The
less-than-satisfactory outcome should give pause to decision makers elsewhere
seeking to recapitalize their own fleets. If the above-mentioned problems befell
a country with a long history of building sophisticated naval vessels, those with
less experience and less money to correct programmatic errors may also see their
naval construction projects and maritime security goals come to grief.” This
should come as cold comfort indeed to those familiar with the recent history
of naval procurement in the United States. Ben Lombardi and David Rudd are
strategic analysts with Defence Research and Development Canada’s Centre for
Operational Research and Analysis, in Ottawa.
The Royal Navy makes yet another appearance here in “The Other Ultra:
Signal Intelligence and the Battle to Supply Rommel’s Attack toward Suez,” by
Vincent P. O’Hara and Enrico Cernuschi. Because research and publication on
intelligence during World War II and beyond has been so one-sidedly dominated
by British and American scholars, it can be argued, a true appreciation of the intelligence balance during that war remains to be achieved. O’Hara and Cernuschi,
in a well-researched account of the hitherto little-known signals intelligence
successes of the Italian Regia Marina against the British in the central Mediterranean, have made an important contribution to remedying this situation.
Finally, we offer a fascinating dispatch from the front lines of jointness in the
form of Charles Callahan’s “Stowaway Soldier, Camouflage in a Khaki World:
Creating a Single Culture of Trust from Distinct Service Cultures.” Dr. (and
Colonel) Callahan was the first Army officer to serve as deputy commander of
the National Naval Medical Center, in Bethesda.
NEW FROM THE PRESS: NEWPORT PAPER 39
Influence without Boots on the Ground: Seaborne Crisis Response, by Larissa
Forster, the thirty-ninth title in our Newport Papers monograph series, is now
available for sale in print form by the Government Printing Office online bookstore, at http://bookstore.gpo.gov, as well as online at our own site. The monograph is an empirical analysis of crisis characteristics, actors, U.S. involvement,
and outcomes, exploring the political use of naval forces during foreign-policy
crises short of full-scale warfare. Dr. Forster, of the University of Zurich, uses a
statistical model to analyze naval crisis data in ways useful to policy makers and
strategists—outlining the unique characteristics, advantages, and disadvantages
of naval forces and summarizing theoretical literature on naval diplomacy and
coercion, as well as earlier quantitative research.
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IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are now located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College
Coasters Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334, 335,
309). For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at the main
entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (841-2236).
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